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Abstract
This paper discusses EPA’s acquisition and use of science in two decisions regarding
National Ambient Air Quality Standards:  the 1987 Revision of the NAAQS for
Particulate Matter and the 1993 Decision Not to Revise the NAAQS for Ozone.  In the
first case, more than ten years before EPA proposed to revise the NAAQS for
particulates, narrowly-scoped results of academic experiments suggesting that the agency
should focus its regulatory efforts on smaller diameter suspended particulates penetrated
deep into the agency, far removed from decisionmakers in Washington.  The particulates
review was elaborate and protracted and was promoted and inhibited by multiple factors.
Due to the lengthy review period, however, researchers involved in complex
epidemiological studies were able to produce information which bore directly on
regulator’s questions prior to the final decision.  Such is a rarity given the normal
mismatch between the pace of regulatory decisionmaking and the time required to
produce, analyze, and verify original scientific data.  These studies observed an increase in
respiratory ailments in children at particulate concentrations experienced in U.S. urban
areas and suggested the lack of a discernible threshold in the relationship between
particulate levels and mortality.  Furthermore, as the decision was being finalized, the
agency leadership was warned that forthcoming studies would probably suggest health
concerns at even lower levels than the lowest end of the proposed range.  In the case of
ozone, political factors and a divided Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (CASAC)
led to a 1992 proposal by EPA Administrator Reilly not to revise the NAAQS for ozone.
Administrator Browner essentially inherited this decision during the transition period
between the Bush and Clinton administrations, and although the role of science in the final
decisionmaking was not substantive, the scientific review process was considered.  The
ozone case study illustrates that an elaborate and lengthy NAAQS review process is
required to make science available for consideration by EPA decisionmakers and that
policy disagreements within CASAC provide the Administrator with a justification to not
revise the NAAQS on the basis of  “scientific uncertainty.”  Both cases provide examples
of non-agency scientists operating in multiple, overlapping roles inside and outside the
regulatory decisionmaking process.  The  NAAQS case studies also underscore that the
Clean Air Act is based on the false scientific premise that a threshold level exists below
which health effects from ubiquitous air pollutants will not be observed.  As a
consequence of this mistaken legislative presumption, new scientific developments
inevitably point toward ever more stringent ambient standards and preordain--in principle-
-the outcome of periodic reviews of the scientific basis of air quality regulation.  In
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INTRODUCTION
The case studies included in this discussion paper are part of a project that
Resources for the Future (RFF) is conducting under a cooperative agreement with the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and with general support from RFF.  The
case studies were originally vetted as RFF Discussion Paper 97-07 in 1996, and this
revised version of the discussion paper reflects many useful comments and corrections
supplied by reviewers.
The overall study is broadly concerned with the acquisition and use of scientific
information by the Environmental Protection Agency in regulatory decisionmaking.  The
overall study focuses chiefly on national rulemaking (e.g., setting National Ambient Air
Quality Standards and banning pesticides or toxic substances), as opposed to site-specific
decisionmaking (e.g., Superfund remedy selection).  For the purposes of this study,
environmental “science” refers to information that can be used in assessing risks to human
health, welfare, and the environment.   (Therefore, economic and engineering information
are not a chief focus of this study.)  The project aims to help policymakers and others
better understand the factors and processes that influence EPA's acquisition and use of
science in national rulemaking so that they can better evaluate recommendations for
improving environmental regulatory institutions, policies, and practices.
In all, eight case studies will be included as appendices to the full report:
• 1987 Revision of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for
Particulates (NAAQS)
• 1993 Decision Not to Revise the NAAQS for Ozone
• 1991 Lead/Copper Rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
• 1995 Decision to Pursue Additional Research Prior to Revising the Arsenic
Standard under SDWA
• 1983/4 Suspensions of Ethylene Dibromide under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
• 1989 Asbestos Ban & Phaseout Rule under the Toxic Substances Control
Act
• Control of Dioxins (and other Organochlorines) from Pulp & Paper
effluents under the Clean Water Act (as part of the combined air/water
“cluster rule” proposed in 1993)
• Lead in Soil at Superfund Mining Sites
The case studies were selected in consultation with informal advisors to the project
and are not intended as a random or representative sample of EPA regulatory decisions.
None of the case studies could be fairly characterized as routine or pedestrian.  As a
group, the cases tend toward the “high-profile” end of the distribution of EPA decisions.
Nevertheless, among the case studies, there is some variability in the political and
economic stakes involved and in the level of development of the underlying science.  The
cases selected involve each of the “national” environmental regulatory statutes (Clean Air
Act; Safe Drinking Water Act; Toxic Substances Control Act; Federal Insecticide,Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS iv
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; and Clean Water Act), and two cases involve decisions to
maintain the status quo (ozone and arsenic), as opposed to the remainder of the cases
which involve decisions to change from the status quo.
Methodology
Development of the case studies was based on literature review and interviews
with persons inside and outside EPA.  The number of interviewees per case study varied
roughly from a half dozen to a dozen.  There was an effort to ensure balance in the group
of respondents for any particular case study, but because of the relatively small number of
respondents and the non-random nature of the selection process, extreme caution should
be taken in interpreting the numerical response summaries that are reported.  Interviews
were conducted primarily using a structured questionnaire format, but in some cases,
comments were sought from specific individuals regarding particular issues instead of the
case as a whole.  In addition to interviews specific to particular case studies, interviews
were also conducted for the overall study to elicit the views of current and former
policymakers, senior scientists, specialists in regulatory science issues, and others
regarding EPA’s acquisition and use of science.  The case studies also incorporate many
comments and insights from these interviewees.
In all instances, interviewees were given the option of speaking for attribution or
off-the-record, and almost all respondents elected to speak off-the-record.  A complete
listing of the more than 100 interviewees for the overall study will be included as an
appendix to the final report.  The selection of interviewees considered that individuals
from the bench scientist through the agency staff analyst to the politically appointed
decisionmaker, as well as advocates from outside the agency, would provide informative
perspectives.  Among the wide range of interviewees were:  5 of 6 former EPA
Administrators, 4 current or former Deputy Administrators, and 5 current or former
Assistant Administrators; 4 current or former congressional staff; several current and
former EPA Science Advisory Board members; various representatives of industry and
environmental advocacy groups; environmental journalists; and academics from the
diverse fields of biology, public health, economics, political science, psychology, and
philosophy.  But to better understand the processes occurring within the agency,
interviewees were disproportionately selected from among current and former EPA
officials.
A prominent feature of the case studies consists of an effort to map the origins,
flow, and effect of scientific information relating to a particular decision.  To accomplish
this, the case studies make use of an extended analogy to fate and transport modeling.  As
used in risk assessment, this modeling procedure predicts the movement and
transformation of pollutants from their point of origin to their ultimate destination.   Thus,
to extend the analogy, one can imagine universities and research institutes “emitting”
scientific findings, which are disseminated and “transformed” by the media and consultants
outside the agency.  (An alternative pattern is when scientific findings are generated within
EPA by agency scientists.)  Science can enter EPA through multiple “exposure routes,”
which assimilate information differently; once inside the agency, information isParticulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS v
“metabolized” prior to its “delivery” to the “target organ” (the decision-maker).  This fate
and transport terminology is adopted because it is part of the vernacular of many of those
providing the information and of many of the ultimate users of the study results.  Figure A
presents a simplified model of the fate and transport of science in environmental regulation
for illustrative purposes.
Figure A.  Fate and Transport of Science in Environmental Regulation
Making use of these conceptual models, we attempt to address questions
specifically about the scientific information in each of the case studies, such as:  what are
the sources and their relative contributions?  where are the points-of-entry?  who are the
gatekeepers?  what is the internal transport mechanism?  how is the information
transformed as it flows through the agency?  what does and doesn’t get communicated to
the decisionmaker?  and where and how is the information ultimately applied?
Comments on the case studies should be addressed to:
Mark Powell, Fellow
Center for Risk Management
Resources for the Future
1616 P St., NW
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A. The 1987 Revision of the NAAQS for Particulate Matter
1. Background
In October 1948, a dense fog blanketed Donora, PA.  Approximately 40% of the
population of 10,000 suffered some ill symptoms.  Twenty people, mostly adults with pre-
existing cardiopulmonary conditions, died during or shortly after the fog.  A series of
similar winter episodes occurred in London between 1948 and 1962 (EPA 1982a).  In
retrospect, the cause of these public health episodes--air pollution trapped by thermal
inversions--seems painfully obvious.  However, several years passed before scientists
excluded alternative potential causes and identified air pollution as the culprit.  Beginning
in 1963 and culminating in 1990, Congress enacted an escalating series of statutes to
address air pollution on a national basis.
The 1963 Clean Air Act (CAA) directed the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) to prepare Criteria Documents (CDs) (hence the term “criteria” air
pollutants) summarizing scientific information on widespread air pollutants for use by state
and local public health agencies.  The 1967 Air Quality Act specified the role of CDs in
the development of state air quality standards.  A year later, the Surgeon General
established a National Air Quality Criteria Advisory Committee to review and advise on
CDs.  In 1969, HEW produced the original CD for particulate matter (PM).  On the basis
of HEW’s CD, and in response to the 1970 CAA Amendments, EPA promulgated the first
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for PM in April 1971 (36 Fed. Reg.
8186).
1
The 1970 CAA also required that the NAAQS be based on air quality criteria that
reflect the latest scientific information and that both the criteria and standards be
periodically reviewed and, if appropriate, revised.  In 1976, as a result of internal EPA
review and recommendations of the EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB),
2 the agency
decided to revisit all of the criteria air pollutants, with work scheduled to begin on a
combined PM/sulfur oxides (SOx) Criteria Document in 1979.
3  Dissatisfied with EPA’s
progress in re-evaluating the original NAAQS, Congress directed the agency in the 1977
CAA Amendments to revise or reauthorize all of the NAAQS by Dec. 31, 1980, and every
five years thereafter.  The 1977 Amendments also required the Clean Air Science
                                               
1 Primary NAAQS are intended to protect the public from known or reasonably anticipated adverse health
effects with an adequate margin of safety.  Secondary NAAQS are intended to protect public welfare from
known or reasonably anticipated adverse effects on environmental and economic resources and personal
well-being.  However, this case study does not discuss the secondary NAAQS for particulates.
2 The SAB was created by an administrative order in 1974 (Jasanoff 1990).
3 The criteria air pollutants now include carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen oxides, ozone, particulates, and
sulfur oxides.  According to an EPA official, the agency elected to schedule a revision of the ozone criteria
first because the states “hadn’t worked hard to implement” that NAAQS.  SOx was included with PM
because sulfate aerosols constitute a substantial portion of fine suspended particulate matter.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 2
Advisory Committee (CASAC) to review the air quality criteria and standards and report
directly to the Administrator and to Congress (Sec. 109, emphasis added).
4
Litigation brought against EPA by the Iron and Steel Institute in 1978 was
designed to keep the particulate review “in limbo,” according to a former EPA official.
But in October 1979, the agency announced that it was in the process of revising the
Criteria Document for PM and SOx and reviewing the existing NAAQS for possible
revisions (44 Fed. Reg. 56731).  In April 1980, EPA released for external review the first
of three drafts of the revised PM/SOx Criteria Document, prepared by EPA Office of
Research and Development Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office (ECAO) (45
FR 24913).  From August 1980 to January 1981, EPA convened six public meetings of
CASAC to review the CD, the second draft of which was released late in January (46 FR
9746).  In the Spring of 1981, the EPA air program Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards (OAQPS) released the first draft of the Staff Paper (SP), a document informed
by the Criteria Document and additional analysis which presents air program office staff
recommendations regarding the NAAQS.  In July and November of 1981, CASAC
reviewed the second and third drafts of ECAO’s criteria and the first and second drafts of
OAQPS’ staff analysis and recommendations.
In January 1982, a little over two years since EPA’s initial announcement that the
review was underway, CASAC sent a closure memorandum to the Administrator, Anne
Gorsuch, indicating satisfaction with the final drafts of the CD and SP.  Meanwhile, in
order to make it clear that the agency would not use a particulates revision as a backdoor
route to institute a regulatory acid rain program, PM and SOx were decoupled
administratively.
5  Reducing the scope of the review might have been expected to facilitate
a timely decision; however, to comply with a 1981 Executive Order issued by the Reagan
administration (E.O. 12291), EPA was now required to prepare an economic Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA) on proposed major regulations for submission to the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
6  In addition, no administrative action was
politically feasible during the tumultuous period surrounding Gorsuch’s 1983 resignation.
                                               
4 The 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments authorized the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(CASAC) to review all Criteria Documents prior to proposal and promulgation of national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS).  The Environmental Research, Development and Demonstration Act
(ERDDA) of 1978 gave statutory footing to the EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) and also required that
the SAB review the criteria and the NAAQS.  Consequently, CASAC is administered by the SAB but has
a distinct charter and independent status.  In a provision which provides CASAC a broader scope of
legitimate commentary than the rest of the agency’s official science advisory committees, the 1977
Amendments authorized the Committee to advise the Administrator of “any adverse public health,
welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may result from various strategies for attainment and
maintenance of such national ambient air quality standards.”  Not surprisingly, CASAC’s exercise of its
authority to comment on extra-scientific matters has been an episodic source of friction between the
Committee and EPA.
5 According to an EPA official, to do so, the agency would have had to institute a PM “cut value” of 3.5
microns, and indirectly implementing an acid rain program via the particulate standard would have been
much more costly than a direct approach.  In 1996, EPA proposed to revise the PM standard by adding
PM2.5 standards to the current PM10 standards (Fed. Reg., Vol. 27, p. 1721).
6 An estimated annual cost of $100 million was the threshold for “major” regulations under E.O. 12291.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 3
In February 1984, EPA released an RIA for the particulates NAAQS, the
monetized health benefits of which were based to a significant extent on epidemiological
morbidity analyses.
7   A month later, the agency issued its notice of proposed rulemaking
(49 Fed. Reg. 10408).  On the same day, ORD’s ECAO released a newly revised Criteria
Document.  Given the lag in EPA’s review of the NAAQS for particulates occasioned by
the change in administrations, the agency was appropriately concerned that its rulemaking
would be susceptible to legal challenges that it did not “reflect that latest scientific
8  Already two years had passed since CASAC signed-off on the agency’s
scientific analysis.  However, the Criteria Document also reinforced the notion that the
epidemiological basis of the RIA was viewed with great skepticism by EPA’s science
analysts.
Some respondents suggested that the mistrust of regulatory analysis based on
epidemiology was, at least in part, a manifestation of “CHESS Syndrome.”  The CHESS
(Community Health and Environmental Surveillance System) research program began in
1967 under HEW’s National Air Pollution Control Administration, and EPA inherited the
program when the agency was created in 1970.  In the public health tradition, CHESS
collected ambient measurements and conducted epidemiological studies for criteria air
pollutants.  Problems with the CHESS program came to light when questions arose
concerning a 1974 EPA study of SOx.  A 1975 SAB review of the study criticized both the
epidemiological methods and presentation of the findings, and a series of 1976 Los
Angeles Times articles alleged that EPA staff had deliberately distorted data to support
their regulatory position.  The news was followed by hearings and investigations by the
House Committee on Science and Technology which concluded that the CHESS program
at best served only to confirm previous scientific findings and that, as a result of
inadequate peer review, the SOx study was useless for regulatory purposes (Jasanoff 1990,
pp. 84-86).  As an EPA official recalls, “The Brown report [Rep. George Brown (D-CA),
then chair of the House Science Committee] on the CHESS studies set the in-house ‘epi’
program back and tarnished the studies that were to be used in the early ‘80s.  It clouded
‘epi’ studies in general, and the agency lost eight years of  ‘epi’ work.”
9
In December 1985, CASAC concluded that relevant new studies had emerged over
the preceding four years and recommended that the agency prepare addenda to the
Criteria Document and Staff Paper.  During 1986, addenda prepared by EPA analysts in
ECAO and OAQPS were drafted, reviewed internally and externally, approved by
CASAC,  revised, and released (EPA 1986a,b).  In July 1987, nearly 8 years after the
                                               
7 The principal economic analysis was prepared in 1983 by Mathtech for the EPA Economic Analysis
Branch, OAQPS.
8 American Iron and Steel filed suit in the U.S. Dist. Court, DC alleging that EPA did not use the latest
science in the revised Criteria Document (Inside EPA, 5/11/84, p. 5).
9 Although epidemiology has regained some credibility within the agency, several respondents
characterized the agency’s scientific culture as being dominated by experimental sciences such as
toxicology, with observational sciences such as epidemiology and economics being subordinate.  Note the
debate in the arsenic in drinking water case study (Powell 1996) about the sufficiency of epidemiological
evidence in the absence of supporting toxicological evidence.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 4
agency announced the revision was underway, Administrator Lee Thomas signed the final
rule (52 Fed. Reg. 24634).  Table A-1 provides background for the development of
national regulation and policy for ambient air particulates.  Table A-2 provides a timeline
of the 1987 NAAQS revision.
Table A-1.  Background on US Regulation of Particulate Air Pollution.
1948 Air pollution episode in Donora, PA affects 40% of the town’s population.  Similar episodes
occur in London and the US Eastern Seaboard over the next decades.
1963 Clean Air Act directs the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to prepare
Criteria Documents (CDs) summarizing science on widespread air pollutants for use by state
and local public health agencies.
1967 Air Quality Act specifies role of CDs in development of state air quality standards.  National
Air Pollution Control Administration initiates Community Health and Environmental
Surveillance System (CHESS) research program.
1969 Surgeon General establishes National Air Quality Criteria Advisory Committee.  Original
Criteria Document for particulate matter (PM), measured in Total Suspended Particulates
(TSP), produced by HEW.
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments call for National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).
EPA inherits national air pollution control authority and begins setting original NAAQS on
the basis of HEW CDs.
1971 EPA promulgates original NAAQS for PM, setting a 24-hour level of 260 mg/m
3 and an
annual level of 75 mg/m
3, measured in TSP.
1970s Experimental findings indicate that TSP includes nonrespirable, coarse particles.
1976 EPA decides to revisit all of the NAAQS, with work scheduled to begin on a combined
PM/sulfur oxides Criteria Document in 1979.
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments direct EPA to revise or reauthorize all of the NAAQS by Dec.
31, 1980, and every five years thereafter.  The Amendments also establish the Clean Air
Science Advisory Committee.
1987 EPA promulgates revised NAAQS for PM, setting a primary standard based on a 24-hour
level of 150 mg/m3 and an annual level of 50 mg/m
3 using the PM10 indicator, which
measures finer-sized particles than TSP.
1994 The Federal District Court of AZ orders EPA to review and, if necessary, revise the current
NAAQS for particulates by January 31, 1997.
1996      EPA proposes to revise the current annual and daily PM10 standards by adding new annual
and daily standards based on PM2.5 .Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 5
Table A-2.  Timeline of the 1987 Particulate Matter NAAQS Revision.
1974 EPA air program begins investigating fine particle standard.
1979 EPA announces that it is in the process of revising the criteria document for particulate
matter (and sulfur oxides), and reviewing existing air quality standards for possible
revisions.
1980 April 11.  Draft 1 of revised particulate matter/sulfur oxides criteria document (CD),
prepared by ECAO, made available for external review
August 20-22.  CASAC public meeting to review draft 1 of CD.  The committee
recommends  5 additional public meetings be held at EPA to discuss the draft.  Meetings
held: November 7, 1980; November 20, 1980; November 25, 1980; December 4, 1980;
January 7, 1981.
1981 January 29.  CD Draft 2 released.
Spring.  First draft of Staff Paper prepared by OAQPS.
July 7-9.  CASAC public meeting to review Draft 2 of CD, Draft 1 of SP.
October 28.  CD Draft 3 released.
November 16-18.  CASAC public meeting to review Draft 3 of CD and Draft 2 of SP.
December.  Final draft of CD completed.
1982 January.  CASAC closure memorandum endorses CD and SP.  Final Draft of SP released.
December.  Final Draft of CD released.
1983 EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch-Burford resigns.
1984 February.  EPA releases Regulatory Impact Analysis.
March.  ECAO issues revised CD.
March 20.  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposes replacing TSP with PM10, and
a primary standard with a 24-hour level in the range of 150 to 250 mg/m
3 and an annual
level in the range of  50 to 65 mg/m
3.
1985 December 16-17.  CASAC meets to discuss relevance of new scientific studies on health
effects of PM that emerged since the committee completed its review of the CD and SP in
January, 1982. The committee recommends that the Agency prepare separate addenda to the
CD and SP.
1986 May 22-23.  Peer-review workshop at EPA (Research Triangle Park) to review First Draft of
CD Addendum.
July 3.  External review draft of CD Addendum available.
September 16.  External review draft of SP Addendum available.
October 15-16.  CASAC public meeting to review Draft CD and SP Addenda.  The SP and
CASAC float reduced lower ends of the proposed ranges for the daily and annual levels (140
mg/m
3 and 40 mg/m
3, respectively.)
December.  CASAC sends closure memorandum on CD and SP Addenda to Administrator.
Final CD and SP Addenda released.
1987 July 1.  EPA promulgates final rule replacing TSP with PM10 and setting primary NAAQS
levels at 150 mg/m
3 (daily) and 50mg/m
3 (annual).
The 1971 primary NAAQS for particulates, based on Total Suspended Particulates
(TSP), included a daily (24-hour arithmetic) average of 260 mg/m
3 and an annual
(geometric
10) average of 75 mg/m
3.  Experimental studies conducted by academics in the
                                               
10 Because the geometric mean is less sensitive to extreme values than is the arithmetic mean, it is
commonly used as an indicator of central tendency for asymmetric distributions such as the lognormal.
The annual “geometric average” is lower than the arithmetic average and is less dependent on days with
the highest recorded particulate levels.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 6
late-60s and 1970s demonstrated that the fraction of PM that deposited deep in the
pulmonary system (where particles may have adverse health effects) consisted of the
smaller diameter components.  EPA researchers recognized the implications:  by
regulating on the basis of TSP in 1971, “the agency realized it was missing the boat by
measuring the wrong size category and having industry focus on the wrong size category,”
according to an EPA official.  The 1984 proposal generated a range of alternative
standards based on PM10, a PM indicator focused on particles with a diameter of 10
microns or less:  150 - 250 mg/m
3 for the daily (arithmetic) average and 50 - 65 mg/m
3 for
the annual (arithmetic) average.  The 1986 Staff Paper Addendum included lower bounds
for the daily and annual PM10 ranges, 140 mg/m
3 and 40 mg/m
3, respectively (1986b).   In
1987, the final rule established the lower bound of the proposed ranges for both the daily
(150 mg/m
3) and the annual (50 mg/m
3) levels of PM10.  New scientific findings, in the
form of the particle deposition experiments, had penetrated the agency and initiated the
long, complex sequence of revision.
Ultimately, the 1987 revisions do not appear to have appreciably tightened or
relaxed the standard levels.  Instead the result was a more refined targeting of pollution
control and monitoring efforts on the finer-sized fraction of PM.  In October 1994, seven
years after the 1987 revision, a federal district court, in response to a suit brought by the
American Lung Association, ordered EPA to review and, if necessary, revise the current
NAAQS for particulates by January 31, 1997 (ALA v. Browner, DC AZ, 10/6/94).  In
November 1997, EPA proposed to revise the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter on the basis of a slowly accumulated mass of epidemiological work
(Fed. Reg., Vol. 27, p. 1721).  (See also Friedlander and Lippman 1994.)
2. Scientific Issues
Interviewees unanimously responded that overall there was adequate scientific
information available in 1987 to inform the decision to revise the particulate NAAQS.
11
However, respondents identified a number of areas in which there was considerable
scientific uncertainty, including:  the specific constituents of particulate matter that were
responsible for causing the observed effects; extrapolation between different ambient
particle measures (i.e., British Smoke, TSP, PM10) and from acute (high level, short
duration) to chronic (low level, long duration) exposures; and interpretation of
epidemiological studies utilizing subjective reported morbidity response data (e.g.,
restricted activity days).  In terms of the overall magnitude of uncertainty, respondents’
opinions varied markedly, although it seems that the most certain scientific issue was the
implications of the studies demonstrating that smaller particles deposited more deeply in
                                               
11 The unanimity of respondents, of course, should not be interpreted to mean that there were no dissenters
in the scientific community.  For example, some British scientists criticized EPA for using London
mortality data associated with air pollution episodes to estimate human health effects at low particulate
concentrations (e.g., Holland et al. 1979, cited in Friedlander and Lippman 1994).  Some scientists and
analysts affiliated with US industry (notably the electric power and steel sectors) also suggested that the
uncertainties associated with quantitative risk assessments of particulates were too large to make them
useful for regulatory purposes (e.g., Roth et al. 1986.)Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 7
the lungs.  An EPA air program official commented that “there were many uncertainties.
It’s hard to know how they would combine quantitatively.”  The discussion below focuses
on the determination of the appropriate particle size for the standard and on the
consideration of the ambient particulate levels at which adverse health effects may occur.
Particle Size
Ambient particulate matter represents a broad class of chemically and physically
diverse substances including liquid droplets or solids ranging in size from 0.005 to 100
microns.
12  On the basis of the 1969 HEW Criteria Document, EPA set the 1971 NAAQS
using the TSP indicator of particulate matter.  Aerometric TSP samplers vacuum
suspended particles from the air and collect them in sizes up to 25-45 microns on filters
(EPA 1982b).
According to an EPA official, air researchers recognized early on that TSP was a
crude indicator because a variety of experimental dosimetry
13 results published in the late-
60s and 1970s indicated that only particles much finer in diameter (on the order of 10
microns or less) were likely to deposit in the thoracic region, deep in the lungs (see, e.g.,
Albert et al. 1973, Lippman 1977).
14  Larger particles tend to be blocked or expelled from
higher regions of the oronasal passages and thus would have minimal impact on lung
function, respiratory ailments such as bronchitis, respiratory and cardiovascular disease, or
mortality.  In addition, atmospheric particles were shown to generally occur in a bimodal
size distribution, with a fine fraction and a coarse fraction conventionally separated by a
particle diameter of 2.5 microns (e.g., Whitby 1975).
15  On the weight basis used to set the
particulates NAAQS in 1971, the large, non-respirable particles collected by TSP samplers
dominated the smaller, respirable particles collected by the instruments.
Beginning in 1978, additional particulate depositional work was done at EPA by
ORD’s Health Effects Research Laboratory (HERL).  Beyond synthesizing the
accumulated literature, researchers at HERL conducted some original dosimetry work,
and perhaps more importantly, connected the depositional results with the performance of
aerometric sampling instruments to develop a recommended “cut value” for a revised
particulates standard.  A nominal, or 50% cutpoint refers to the particle diameter for
which the efficiency of particle collection by sampling instruments is 50%.  Larger
particles are not excluded but are collected with decreasing efficiency (i.e., the larger the
diameter of the suspended particle, the lower the likelihood of collection).  A 1979 paper
by HERL staff concluded that a cut value of 15 microns or less would ensure that the
                                               
12 1 micron = 1 mm = 10
-6 meters = 1 micrometer.
13 Dosimetry refers to measurements of the dose of a chemical substance delivered to a specific organ in
the body.  The delivered dose can differ markedly from ambient concentrations to which people are
exposed in rate, concentration, and kind (e.g., size fraction, metabolites).
14 According to an academic researcher, the original depositional studies were conducted primarily at New
York University (NYU) and Frankfurt, Germany.  The NYU studies received early support from NIOSH
and the American Medical Association but were primarily funded by NIEHS.
15 Although the reference for Whitby (1975) reports EPA grant support, according to the EPA official, this
work was funded by both EPA and the National Science Foundation (NSF).Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 8
NAAQS would focus on the inhalable fine fraction of suspended particulates (Miller et al.
1979).
Projections of areas that would fall into non-attainment for the particulates
NAAQS without further controls were sensitive to the selection of the cut point, and the
mining industry, whose emissions are predominately in the coarse fraction, argued for
smaller cut points (e.g., PM6).  However, the issue was largely put to bed when, in 1981,
the International Standards Organization adopted a nominal 10 micron cut point for
particles that could penetrate the thoracic region (ISO 1981).  Although technical support
for the 10 micron level was based on the operating efficiencies of sampling instruments,
rather than on any health basis, a former EPA official suggests that the argument for
international harmonization of standards provided political cover for what was essentially
a judgment call within the range below 15 microns.  In 1984, the agency proposed to
replace TSP with PM10.
16
Mortality and Morbidity
Having determined the particle size of concern, the next issue to be dealt with, as
required under the Clean Air Act, was to determine the ambient concentration of PM10 at
which no reasonably expected adverse health effects would occur, including an allowance
for an adequate margin of safety, and taking into consideration sensitive members of the
population.  However, this legislative framing of the issue presumes that there exists an
identifiable threshold level below which no adverse effects occur.  “This is the problem
with ambient air quality standards,” concludes a former EPA researcher.  “What you’re
trying to do is ludicrous--set the level below which the most sensitive person in the
population will have no adverse health effects.  In fact, it is impossible to come up with a
scientifically justifiable number.  The only intelligent way is cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analysis, but we don’t do that.”  Saddled with a scientifically unsound
congressional mandate, EPA undertook to determine the lowest levels of PM10 at which
mortality and morbidity effects could be detected or reasonably inferred.
The EPA HERL and other laboratories conduct clinical studies of humans in
environmentally controlled exposure chambers, and numerous chamber studies were
conducted for PM/SOx prior to 1987 (see EPA 1982a, 1986a).  However, the
experimental conditions lack generalizability, in particular to chronic exposures, and the
subjects employed are often healthy adults not representative of sensitive populations at
risk:  the elderly, those with pre-existing conditions, and children.
17  According to some
respondents, toxicological experiments with laboratory animals provided very clear
mechanistic support for the adverse effects of SOx aerosols in animals.  Furthermore,
dosimetry work helped researchers bridge the gap between the toxicological findings in
animals and the chamber study results in humans.  However, unlike most pollutants, PM is
                                               
16 In a letter sent to EPA Adm. Carol Browner after reviewing the first draft of EPA’s 1995 Staff Paper for
PM, CASAC Chairman George Wolff  reported that several CASAC members “felt that the selection of a
Risk Policy Report, 1/19/96, pp. 5-6).
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defined by its size; it is not chemically specified or even associated with a particular
industrial process.
18  The effects of toxicological experiments with inhaled particulates
depend largely on their chemical composition, which varies considerably in the
environment.  As a result, “the toxicological basis for particulates is weaker than for other
criteria air pollutants,” according to an EPA air program official.
Given the limits of experimental data in determining “safe” particulate levels,
analysts turned to epidemiology to establish associations between observed mortality and
morbidity in populations exposed to measured ambient particulate levels.  Three sets of
epidemiological studies are noteworthy.  Studies of London mortality data, which were
relevant to acute exposures; the Harvard Six City study, which was primarily relevant to
chronic exposures;
19 and a final set of studies (which were questioned by health scientists
but included in the economic RIA) relating chronic particulate exposures to reported
morbidity measures.
For the purposes of setting regulatory levels of PM10, most attention was focused
on studies which would influence the daily standard because it was generally considered to
drive the annual standard.  Considering the 24-hour and annual standards together, for
example, EPA (1986b) projected that attaining a 24-hour standard of 150 mg/m
3 would
substantially reduce annual average levels in a number of areas to below 50 mg/m
3.
Analyses of London mortality data had been accumulating in the literature for more than
20 years at the time of the PM review (e.g., Martin and Bradley 1960), but transfer of the
results to the US was frustrated by the incomparability of British and US air pollution
measures.  The British smokeshade (BS) indicator analyzes light reflected from a stain
formed by particulate matter collected on paper.  The collection equipment typically
employed had a cutpoint of approximately 4.5 microns (EPA 1982a).  Unlike the TSP or
PM10 measures, the BS method did not permit direct measurement of the weight or
chemical composition of collected particles.  Instead, it reflected the density of the stain
and the optical properties of the collected materials.  As a result, the BS method was a
better measure for sooty dark particles, such as elemental carbon, than for aerosols, such
as sulfates.
In the 1980s, academic epidemiologists, EPA policy analysts, and others re-
analyzed the London data (e.g., Mazumdar et al. 1980; Ostro 1984; Schwartz and Marcus
1986).  The re-analyses suggested the lack of a threshold in the relationship between
“British smoke” levels and mortality.  The conundrum of comparing incomparable
measurements was bypassed by re-analyzing the London data on its own merits.  “Nobody
                                               
18 An illustration of the latter would be whole effluent testing, which applies aquatic toxicology to an
unspecified waste stream originating from a specified process, such as leather tanning.
19 In addition to the chronic exposure study discussed below, the Harvard Six City Study also included
investigations of reversible declines in lung function in children associated with acute exposures (Dockery
et al. 1982).  Only the acute study was longitudinal in design, meaning that the study population was
observed over time.  The chronic study was cross-sectional in design, meaning that the health status of the
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knew how to convert from BS to PM-10,” allows a former EPA analyst, “but the lack of a
threshold was clear, or if there was one, it clearly went down to very low levels.”
There remains some uncertainty in exporting the results, however, as a
consequence of the differences in composition of particulate matter between London, ca.
1958-72 (with soot from coal use) and contemporary US cities where particulates of
concern are predominately aerosols and fine dusts.  Mortality studies conducted solely on
the basis of epidemiological data in contemporary US cities, however, suffer from an
inability to tease the potentially independent effects of particulates apart from the potential
contributions of other air pollutants which may be correlated with PM, such as ozone and
SOx.  In addition, it is uncertain to what extent the relationship between mortality and
acute air pollution exposures reflects the death of previously ill people whose lives may be
shortened by a matter of days or weeks, the ghoulishly dubbed “harvesting effect.”
The Harvard Six City Study (Ware et al. 1986) found that increased rates of
bronchitis and lower respiratory illness in preadolescent children were associated with
annual average ambient fine particulate concentrations.  In addition to their focus on a
biologically sensitive--and politically salient--subpopulation, the relevance of the Harvard
study results was that the effects were neither associated with historic episodes of gross
air pollution nor observed in Europe, but were observed at concentrations experienced in
eastern and midwestern US cities between 1974 and 1977.
20
A series of epidemiological studies by economists and policy analysts developed
quantitative relationships between chronic ambient particulate exposures and morbidity
effects for which monetary values could be readily attributed (e.g., Lave and Seskin 1977;
Ostro, 1983).  According to a number of respondents, these studies tended to suggest net
economic benefits at levels of particulates lower than current standards.  However,
experimental scientists had numerous objections to relying on these studies for quantitative
assessments of the health impacts of different ambient PM10 concentrations.  For example,
the studies utilized air monitoring data available from networks established for determining
area-wide attainment of NAAQS.  Such monitoring data is often poorly correlated with
actual human exposures within the area, and in addition, most of the PM data were
measured in terms of TSP rather than PM10.  While concurrent TSP and PM10
measurement was initiated in the 1980s on some monitoring sites in some cities to
facilitate eventual conversion between the indicators, the relationship between TSP and
PM10 can vary markedly among sites.  For the majority of monitoring sites without
concurrent TSP and PM10 measurements, any estimated relationship between
“backcasted” PM10 exposures and reported morbidity effects was therefore highly
uncertain.
In addition, these studies used indicators of morbidity that were economically
relevant and available over a broad range of areas and exposure levels, such as responses
                                               
20 The six cities included in the study were:  Steubenville, OH; Watertown, MA; Portage, WI; Topeka,
KA; St. Louis, MO; and Harriman, TN.  The Harvard study received support from NIEHS, EPA, and the
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from the National Health Interview Survey.
21  Such surveys include questions like, “did
you go to work today?”  Without some formal calibration (which could be achieved by
conducting a follow-up, independent confirmation of the accuracy of responses for a
subsample of the survey), the reliability of survey data is hard to assess.  Evaluating
subjective “ordinal” responses from different individuals is also problematic (for example,
the same response to “is your cough severe or mild?” from different people can mask
substantial differences in the severity of symptoms).  Experimental scientists are generally
skeptical of data they regard as “subjective.”  But by relying on overt “clinical” symptoms
associated with acute exposures, analysts may not capture important health effects
resulting from “real world” exposure levels and patterns.  A senior EPA careerist stated
that the epidemiological analysis conducted by economists and included in the RIA “was
not sufficiently developed or broadly accepted.”  ECAO’s Criteria Document gave the
Harvard Study a generally favorable review but concluded that few of the studies on
morbidity effects associated with chronic exposures to airborne particles provided useful
results by which to derive quantitative conclusions concerning exposure-effect
relationships (EPA 1986a).
Regarding the epidemiological evidence overall, responses from the interviewees
were mixed.  Some respondents characterized the epidemiology available for the 1987 PM
revision as good-to-very good, but a former EPA researcher judged that “the ‘epi’ was
only fair.  The methods were underdeveloped, even for their time.  Very few of the studies
controlled for confounding variables.”
22  According to a statistical analyst,  “epi, dose-
response studies are simply hard to carry out.  There’s always going to be different
interpretations with these types of studies.  Some of it points this way; some of it points
that way.  There are not enough scientists, time, and money to come up with definitive
answers.”  As a result, controversies over such studies generally boil down to differing
judgments about what constitutes sufficient evidence in the context of a specific decision.
These judgments will invariably be conditioned by underlying values.
3. The Process within EPA
Setting the Agenda
The legislative mandate for revisiting NAAQS on a five year cycle was the factor
most frequently (6) mentioned by respondents as being responsible for getting the PM
revision on the agency’s agenda.  However, activity within the agency began at least three
years prior to the 1977 CAA Amendments.  One air program official “came into the
agency in 1974 to look into a fine particle standard.”  Despite the legislative requirement
                                               
21 See Adams et al. (1984) for a discussion of the tradeoffs for environmental decisionmaking between
replications at particular exposure levels and coverage over the range of exposures.  In sum, replication
contributes to the precision necessary to discriminate the rank order of the distribution of net benefits
under a limited set of policy alternatives, but without adequate coverage to reduce model uncertainty, the
magnitude of the net benefits remains uncertain.
22 Confounding variables are alternative, uncontrolled factors that may account for variation in the
observed effects--for example, the potential effects of ozone and SOx discussed above.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 12
for periodic review, in the view of a former agency political appointee, “What got the
decision on the agency’s agenda was the depositional studies.”  Therefore, new scientific
information played a key role in setting the regulatory agenda.
Most of the early activity within EPA occurred in Research Triangle Park, NC
where air program offices (OAQPS) and research offices (ECAO and HERL) are co-
located.  A 1974 paper by John Bachmann in the air program’s OAQPS addressed the
question of whether sulfates should be regulated separately from the rest of suspended
particulates.  Four years later, OAQPS requested that ORD’s ECAO begin to address the
issue of particle size and the appropriate cut value for monitoring equipment.  In 1979,
Fred Miller, who previously had been conducting academic research on ozone dosimetry,
and others at HERL made the recommendation to set the nominal cut point at 15 microns
or less.
The Criteria Document-Staff Paper Process
As detailed in the background section above, ECAO and OAQPS spent much of
the next 7 years drafting, vetting, and revising Criteria Documents and Staff Papers for the
PM revision.  Much of the writing of the Criteria Documents for PM was contracted out
to academics and independent researchers.  But with the exception of some of the
exposure assessment work which was contracted, the Staff Papers, according to an air
program official “were basically a 4 person effort” conducted by OAQPS staff.  A number
of respondents commented that the practice of relying on contracted experts to contribute
to Criteria Documents can result in authoritative but unsynthesized analysis.  But ECAO
resources are insufficient to maintain a cadre of full-time staff dedicated to each criteria air
pollutant.
23
While EPA drafted and revised CDs and SPs, the agency’s stated intention to
replace the TSP measure motivated others outside the agency to conduct additional
dosimetry work (which according to an EPA air program official confirmed earlier
findings) and ambient air monitor manufacturers to develop alternative sampling
technology.  During the course of the ongoing scientific review, the agency also initiated
simultaneous monitoring of PM10 and TSP in several areas.  An academic remarked, “Give
the agency credit for gathering that data prior to finishing the review.  The agency set
about to create research networks in numerous cities to make scientifically valid
conversion factors, investing in the resources to get the necessary data.  It was started too
late if they were going to [finalize the rule] by 1985, but it was in time for 1987.”
Early in the review process, EPA staff also approached Harvard investigators
about conducting the “Six City” study.  The agency was motivated to support the research
                                               
23 According to a former EPA air program official, the cost to EPA of developing a NAAQS is in the $4-8
million range.  This estimate may not reflect, however, the cost associated with EPA research (in-house
and extramural) that contributes to the foundation of the standard.  ECAO and OAQPS also have
increasing demands on their resources for conducting risk analyses for Hazardous Air Pollutants as a
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because prior epidemiological studies came from the field of occupational health which did
not cover potentially sensitive or highly exposed populations such as children, the elderly,
or outdoor laborers.  According to an EPA air program official, the Harvard study
represented an early model of environmental regulators “posing questions that the
scientists had not previously asked.”  Combining support from EPA, NIEHS, and EPRI,
the Harvard group began issuing a series of reports on or about 1981 that provided input
into the PM revision (e.g., Ware et al. 1981).  Due to the length of the PM review period,
the Harvard group was able to produce some answers to regulators’ questions prior to the
decision, a rarity for multi-year, complex epidemiological studies.
According to an EPA official, OAQPS requested that Joel Schwartz, an analyst in
the agency’s Office of Policy Analysis (OPA), conduct a re-analysis of the British
mortality data.  Previous re-analyses had been conducted, including one by OPA’s Bart
Ostro (Ostro 1984), but Schwartz and Marcus (1986) addressed a number of
methodological questions raised by reviewers.  This re-analysis carried considerable
weight.  According to an EPA official, “Schwartz had clout because he was smarter than
everybody else.”  (Schwartz had also established some credibility with CASAC on the
strength of his work on the effects of lead air pollution.  See Powell (1996).)  Access to
the raw British mortality data was also a key factor that permitted Schwartz and Marcus
to address the reviewers’ questions.  In the majority of cases, EPA regulatory analysts do
not have access to raw data.  Currently a biostatistician in ECAO, Marcus “was pleasantly
surprised that they were able to get the raw data... It made me optimistic that in-house
researchers could do just as good a job as PIs [principal investigators] and extract the
information that was relevant to the agency.  Now I find that’s not always the case.”  Even
when the agency is able to gain access to the raw data, says Marcus “we generally don’t
have the time and resources to redo the analysis to make sure that [the original
investigators] did it right.”
The proximity of ECAO and OAQPS to each other, the frequent circulation of
personnel between the offices, and their detachment from Headquarters offices in
Washington, DC have resulted in a level of inter-office coordination that, although not
without tensions, is uncommon within the agency.  On the downside, according to a senior
careerist, the close arrangement can sometimes “discourage debate.”  As an illustration,
this EPA official points to the acquiescence to ECAO’s critique of much of the
epidemiological evidence.  Another factor that may have contributed to curtailing
substantive debate was tension between the air program headquarters and OAQPS.
According to an EPA air program official, early in the 1980s headquarters was
complaining, “we’re constantly pulling buckshot out of our ass” for failing to make
revisions more quickly.  Reflecting a typical face-off between careerists and politicos, “DC
felt that OAQPS was hard-headed, not dealing with DC as a client.  RTP [Research
Triangle Park] said ‘we know what we’re doing.’”  According to respondents,
headquarters dispatched Gerald Emison to be the new Director of OAQPS in 1984 “to
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Respondents all characterized the agency’s treatment of the scientific information
available at the time of the decision to revise the PM standard as good-to-very good.
However, an academic provided a qualified endorsement.  “It was very good in terms of
the best that can be done, and very poor in terms of not having enough data.  EPA doesn’t
support any research to speak of,  so they have to find information available from studies
with other objectives. They’re skillful in taking what information is out there and drawing
inferences from it, but the data are very weak.  The agency has never put enough effort
into generating sufficient data.”
Communicating the Science to Agency Leadership
Respondents rated the communication of the scientific information to agency
decisionmakers as good-to-very good.  EPA staff briefed three successive Administrators.
In a meeting that was kept secret from most of the agency, staff briefed Administrator
Anne Gorsuch prior to her resignation, according to an air program official.  Reportedly,
the benefits analysis included in the RIA prevented Gorsuch from relaxing the standard.
Administrator Ruckelshaus was initially briefed in 1983 and later received a two-day
briefing.  However, agency leaders believed that data at that point were inadequate and
questioned why a research strategy had not been laid out and conducted in advance to
provide a better database for the eventual review of the standard.  Why, for example, had
sensitive populations not been addressed? According to a former EPA official,
Administrator Ruckelshaus’s concern that CASAC had not endorsed a specific level for
the PM10  standard led to the unprecedented decision to propose a range for a NAAQS.
As is generally the case, the majority of the communication of scientific
information to agency decisionmakers was conducted orally or through brief memos.
However, Al Alm, Ruckelshaus’ Deputy Administrator who was described as “a voracious
reader,” was supplied with a stream of materials prior to the proposal in 1984.  Alm and
Assistant Administrator for Air Joseph Cannon were also briefed on the benefits analysis,
and according to an air program official, “it helped justify going to the lower bound of the
proposed range in their minds.”  Finally, Lee Thomas was briefed prior to issuing the final
rule in 1987.
There were a number of key agency staff involved in the briefings, including Bruce
Jordan, the OAQPS Ambient Air Standards Branch Chief and ECAO’s Les Grant.  During
his tenure in the Ruckelshaus administration as Assistant Administrator for ORD, Bernard
Goldstein was also influential in translating and interpreting the science for agency
decisionmakers.  But in each case, John Bachmann, the lead author of the OAQPS Staff
Papers, was the principal staffer responsible for communicating the science to the
leadership.  In his role as lead author of the SP, Bachmann served as the bridge between
ECAO and OAQPS.  Bachmann was also responsible for preparations for the lengthy
series of CASAC meetings.  Respondents remarked that Bachmann was an effective
communicator because straddling the science-policy divide, he grasped the relevance of
the scientific findings, and he could talk about the science to decisionmakers in simple
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Regarding the PM revision, an air program official noted, “The process took a
long time from proposal to finalization.  In terms of key players, it was like a conveyor
belt.” Over the entire life of the review, there was not only a change of the guard in the
Administrator’s Office but also turnover at senior political and administrative levels.
Between the proposal and final rulemaking, there was turnover in the air program at the
Assistant Administrator level, from Joseph Cannon to Craig Potter, and the directorship of
OAQPS changed hands from Walter Barber to Gerald Emison.  But careerists such as
Bachmann, Grant, and Jordan were constants.  While agency careerists may retain a
regulatory issue in their portfolio for several years, if not their entire careers, the tenure of
senior political appointees in the federal government is generally on the order of 2 or 3
years.  Therefore, even if EPA were to comply with the 5 year review cycle for NAAQS,
significant turnover of politically accountable decisionmakers would be likely.  As a result,
policymakers are often dependent on careerists for information, and careerists often have
to make allowances for bringing new political appointees up to speed.
The Role of External Scientists in the Process
All respondents characterized the role of non-agency scientists in influencing the
PM revision process as significant-to-very significant, and there was a consensus that non-
agency scientists also played a significant role in legitimizing the agency’s decision.
However, the influence was not entirely positive.  A former EPA researcher argued that
the scientific review process was “protracted by a conscious decision to have the
adversaries present” at agency working sessions.  Some of this input may have served little
more than to strengthen the agency’s record of decision.  On the other hand, some agency
officials believed that industry analysts, from the electric utility sector for example, helped
“sharpen the agency’s analysis” and prompted the agency to “slay those dragons which
can be slain.”  It appears that industry input into the agency’s analysis for setting the
NAAQS levels may have contributed more than industry analysis regarding the
determination of the particle size cut value.
As detailed in the background discussion above, CASAC played an extensive role
in the PM review process.  There was considerable continuity between the 1982 and 1986
panels.  One of the members served on both panels, and four of the 1986 members had
served as consultants to the 1982 panel, including Morton Lippman, Chair of the 1986
panel.
24  Lippman had also been a principal researcher involved in the particulate
deposition studies responsible for getting the PM revision on the agency’s agenda.
EPA analysts were confronted with a lack of official agency guidance for
conducting NAAQS reviews in particular and for non-cancer risk assessments in general.
As a result, respondents noted that the agency “sought CASAC endorsement of what they
were doing” methodologically to ensure scientific credibility and acceptance.  For
                                               
24 The member who served on both panels was Mary Amdur of MIT.  Edward Crandall of Cornell,
Timothy Larson of U. of WA, and Roger McClellan of the Lovelace Research Inst. served as consultants
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example, a critical area where there was no generally accepted scientific method was
converting measurements between TSP and PM10, so the agency relied on CASAC review
and endorsement to ensure the credibility of its conversions.  Apart from methodological
review, CASAC also played a role regarding the NAAQS levels finally adopted by EPA.
The entire range for the standard proposed by the agency in 1984 (150 - 250 mg/m
3) was
intended, in the words of an EPA official “to be protective of public health.”
At its 1986 meeting, however, CASAC suggested that the agency adopt the lower
end of the proposed range and even consider going below it in order to provide a greater
margin of safety.  Although the adequacy of the margin of safety is generally regarded as
an issue in the policy domain, providing such advice seems well within CASAC’s statutory
authority to comment on standards as well as the criteria.  According to one former EPA
official, CASAC suggested that EPA consider a standard below the proposed range to
provide the agency with cover to justify promulgating the standard at the lower bound of
the proposed range (150 mg/m
3).  If this account is accurate, one could reasonably argue
that engaging in this type of strategic behavior exceeds CASAC’s legislative authority to
advise and comment on agency criteria and standards.  However, it should be noted that
the 1986 Staff Paper also included reduced lower bounds of the range.  Another former
EPA official says that CASAC Chair Lippman’s view was that the upper end of the
proposed range provided little, if any, margin of safety and the rest of the committee
deferred to Lippman’s expertise.
4. Science in the Final Decision
In 1987, the final rule established the lower bound of the proposed ranges for both
the daily (150 mg/m
3) and the annual (50 mg/m
3) averages for the PM10 NAAQS.  An EPA
official commented, “Without CASAC endorsement, the agency would be concerned
about the credibility and legal defensibility of the decision.” However, CASAC’s role
should not be overstated.  In issuing the proposal in 1984, Administrator Ruckelshaus
acknowledged that he leaned towards primary
standards from the lower portions of the proposed
ranges.  Respondents also suggested that OAQPS
staff and ECAO’s Lester Grant recommended
setting the daily standard at 150 mg/m
3.  Finally,
according to an air program official,  “One thing a
decisionmaker doesn’t want is to be surprised by studies that are going to come out [after
the decision].”  In the case of the PM revision, agency leadership “was told at the time that
there would probably be studies forthcoming suggesting concern at even lower levels.”
Respondents rated the level of consideration given to the scientific issues by
agency decisionmakers as thorough-to-very thorough, and there was a consensus that the
scientific information had a high impact on the ultimate decision.  The minds of agency
leaders were focused because of the economic stakes involved in the PM NAAQS.  EPA
(1986c) estimates compliance costs of more than $500 million per year.  (The threshold
for a “major” regulation is $100 million per year.)  A senior EPA careerist noted,
at the time that there would
probably be studies forthcoming
suggesting concern at even lower
levels.”Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 17
Administrator Lee Thomas “put a lot of time into it,” and an air program official recalled,
“Lee Thomas had a lot of questions.” According to an air program official, the reason the
“communication [of the scientific information] was so good was because decisionmakers
spent a lot of time trying to understand what the issues were.”  Despite focusing
considerable attention on the scientific issues, according to a former EPA official,
“Thomas was given a very narrow range of staff recommendations; he was given little
Respondents pointed to a scattering of factors that impeded the use of science in
the PM revision, with no one factor being mentioned more than twice.  However,
grouping the problems as follows suggests that respondents believed that the major
impediments were associated with the data and methods and the problems of matching
science with policy.
25
• Problems with the Data and Methods (7):  large scientific uncertainties (2); inadequate
epidemiological and toxicological tools and methods (2); the large volume of
information available; the lack of relevant information; the lack of EPA funding for
research.
 
• Problems Matching Science with Policy (5):  the CAA’s presumption that a pollutant
concentration exists below which there are no adverse health effects; scientists lack
understanding of policymakers’ information needs; policymakers perceive staff
scientific analysis as deficient due to the quality of EPA staff; EPA policymakers lack
understanding of what science can contribute to decisionmaking; the adversarial
rulemaking process.
 
• Problems with Disciplinary Science (2): disciplinary inertia prevents consideration of
new scientific findings; disciplinary boundaries result in fragmented, narrow analyses.
Peer review (both internal and external) was the factor most frequently mentioned
by respondents as facilitating the use of science in the PM revision (6).  Other factors
included the skill of EPA staff (2); the high economic stakes; the clear health basis of the
NAAQS under the CAA; the legislative requirement for periodic revision of the NAAQS;
and good communications between scientists and policymakers.
5. Concluding Observations
More than ten years before EPA proposed to revise the NAAQS for particulates,
the narrowly-scoped results of new particle deposition experiments had penetrated deep
into the agency, far removed from decisionmakers in Washington.  The findings initiated a
long, complex sequence of activity that was promoted and inhibited by multiple factors.  A
key air office staffer, John Bachmann was primarily responsible for transferring the
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accumulating scientific information from the researchers through the air program and
finally to politically accountable decisionmakers.
The primary source of support for the depositional studies conducted by NYU
researchers was NIEHS.  Agency staff in Research Triangle Park dedicated to surveying
the scientific literature for new, relevant information were exposed to the information and
grasped its significance.  However, additional work was needed to transform the
depositional findings into an operational cut value for use in the design of air pollution
monitoring equipment and for setting the NAAQS.  Much of this supplementary work was
conducted within EPA by researchers at HERL.  The mining industry attempted to
influence the agency’s use of the information to further reduce the cut size, but the
International Standards Organization’s position was operationally practical and provided
political cover.  EPA adopted the PM10 indicator.
Due to the lengthy review period, Harvard researchers, supported by NIEHS,
EPA, and EPRI were able to provide information prior to the final decision regarding the
effects on sensitive populations of particulate matter not at levels associated with acute
episodes in foreign lands, but at typical concentrations experienced in U.S. urban areas.
This study was prompted by questions posed by environmental policymakers, not by the
scientific community.  A reanalysis of the British mortality data requested by OAQPS and
conducted by an EPA policy official suggested the lack of a discernible threshold in the
relationship between particulate levels and mortality.  EPA was able to access the raw data
due to international linkages established by ECAO.  Both of these studies were evaluated
favorably by EPA scientists and CASAC and provided scientific support for adopting
levels of the PM10 standards at the lower ends of the proposed ranges.
The epidemiological morbidity studies originating from the economic literature,
however, experienced a slightly different fate.  These studies were based on available
monitoring and health survey data that enabled researchers to evaluate health effects in
economically relevant terms.  In this case, the internal receptor and promoter within the
agency was the Office of Policy Analysis.  ECAO and CASAC, acting in their science
gatekeeper role, rendered these studies somewhat impotent.  Officially, EPA concluded
that too many fundamental questions remained considering the RIA methodology, and in
any event, the CAA did not permit the consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS.
Unofficially, according to respondents, the RIA’s projection of net benefits at levels below
the proposed range for PM10 helped justify the final decision by the Thomas
Administration to select the lowest end of the range and prevented the Gorsuch
Administration from relaxing the NAAQS.  Therefore the economic analysis appears to
have indirectly influenced the outcome toward the same end as scientific analysis.
Irrespective of the impact the information had on the decision, this case study illustrates
how, in the context of a single decision, different organizations and disciplines within EPA
use different sources of scientific information for different purposes and judge the
information by different criteria.  Figure A-1 illustrates the fate and transport dynamics of
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Figure A-1.  Fate and Transport Dynamics for Science in the 1987 Particulate Matter
Revision.
In the course of discussing the 1987 PM review, a number of respondents
expressed frustration with the Criteria Document-Staff Paper process in general.  The
most frequently mentioned source of the problem was ECAO’s practice of developing
voluminous CD’s.  However, respondents also noted that while CASAC has called for
more succinct CD’s, individual panel members display a tendency to strive to ensure that
the documents cover their own disciplines in exhaustive detail.  Whether, in any particular
case, this is “just academics being academics,” as one respondent put it, or strategic
behavior intended to keep their discipline high on the environmental research agenda can
not be determined.
Another criticism of the process was that ECAO and the air program appear
reluctant to work on more than one criteria pollutant at a time.  Again, a number of
factors may be at play.  According to an academic researcher, ORD management has not
made Criteria Document development an organizational priority, and ECAO Director Les
Grant’s direct involvement as a principal author also may limit the number of criteria
pollutants that can be addressed at any given time.  The air program, in turn, is reluctant to
focus on more than one pollutant at a time because doing so would increase the burdens
on state officials and EPA program staff in terms of developing and reviewing State
Implementation Plans for NAAQS attainment.  There may also be a mismatch in terms of
ECAO staffing.  Although NAAQS are increasingly driven by epidemiological findings,
most agency scientific staff have backgrounds in toxicological and other experimental
sciences.  Relatively fewer have backgrounds in epidemiology and statistics.
This case study provides an illustration of non-agency scientists operating in
multiple, overlapping roles.  Three out of seven of the contributors to the 1982 Criteria
Document epidemiological chapter were from the Harvard Study group (Benjamin Ferris,
Frank Speizer, and James Ware).  Ware later served as a member of CASAC in 1986.  It is
not uncommon for scientists to provide evidence as academic researchers, contribute to
ADM
AIR
  OAQPS (SP)
ORD
  ECAO  (CD)






















ECAO LinkParticulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 20
assessments as contractors, and evaluate results from a position on an independent
advisory committee.  In part, this reflects the small number of expert practitioners in highly
specialized areas.  On the other hand, it poses the risks associated with insularity and
inbreeding.
Epilogue:  Regarding the current PM review, an air program official noted that the
Criteria Document and Staff Paper process, which extended over many years and occurred
sequentially in the 1987 revision, has been compressed and run in parallel under the court-
ordered deadline.  Although the CD has been widely faulted for being too long and
unfocused, this official suggested that it is sometimes hard to predict what the OAQPS
staff and CASAC will regard as critical.  In prior reviews the first draft of the CD was
revised while the SP was being developed, providing a feedback loop in the process of
reviewing and interpreting the scientific information.  The court-ordered deadline has the
effect of eliminating or crimping this feedback loop. CASAC also bridled at the
compressed review schedule which only permitted the Committee a single opportunity to
review the CD and SP in draft.  (After EPA proposed to revise the NAAQS for PM in
November 1996, the agency announced that it would convene a meeting of CASAC to
enable the committee to comment on the proposals (Inside EPA, 12/20/96, p. 10.)
In March 1996, CASAC Chair George Wolff sent Administrator Carol Browner a
consensus closure letter regarding the new Criteria Document for Particulate Matter.  In
the letter, Wolff reported that “about half of the Panel members expressed concern that
the case made in the Criteria Document for PM2.5 being the best available surrogate for the
principal causative agent in PM10 may be overstated, and that EPA has not adequately
justified its rejection of other alternative explanations...”  However, Former CASAC Chair
Morton Lippman and three other CASAC members took the rare step of sending Browner
a “supplementary” letter contending that:  there is sufficient evidence of a causal
relationship between PM exposure and excess mortality and morbidity; PM2.5 is better than
any alternative measure; and because some adverse health effects may be linked to coarser
particles, separate fine (i.e., PM2.5) and coarse (i.e., PM10) standards should be considered
(Risk Policy Report, 4/19/96).  Shortly after the elections of November 1996, EPA
proposed to supplement the current primary PM10 standards by adding two new primary
PM2.5 standards set at 15 mg/m
3, annual mean, and 50 mg/m
3, 24-hour average (Fed. Reg.,
Vol., 27, p. 1721).  Given CASAC’s importance in legitimizing EPA’s NAAQS
decisionmaking, it remains to be seen whether the agency can or will revise the standard
without the panel’s unanimous endorsement.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 21
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BS British smokeshade
CAA Clean Air Act
CASAC Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, EPA
CD Criteria Document
CHESS Community Health and Environmental Surveillance System
ECAO Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office, EPA
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
HERL Health Effects Research Laboratory, EPA
HEW Department of Health, Education and Welfare
mg/m
3 micrograms per cubic meter
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standard
NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
NYU New York University
OAQPS Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, EPA
OMB Office of Management and Budget, The White House
OPA Office of Policy Analysis, EPA
PM particulate matter
PM10  particulate matter, 10-micron diameter
PM2.5  particulate matter, 2.5-micron diameter
RIA Regulatory impact analysis
RTP Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
SAB Science Advisory Board, EPA
SOx sulfur oxides
SO2  sulfur dioxide
SP Staff Paper
TSP total suspended particulateParticulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 24
B. The 1993 Decision Not to Revise the NAAQS for Ozone
1. Background
Health effects from ambient levels of tropospheric ozone were first reported in
1967 in terms of lowered performance by high school athletes in California on high-
exposure days (Lippman 1991).  Since then, regulation of tropospheric ozone has
unfolded slowly, despite a legislative requirement for periodic review, and been
characterized by discord and litigation.  The role of science and scientists in the ozone
standard setting process has increased and become more formal over time.  But this has
not diminished the controversy, in large part, because the Clean Air Act is based on the
false scientific premise that a threshold level exists below which health effects from
ubiquitous air pollutants will not be observed.  As a consequence of this mistaken
legislative presumption, new scientific developments inevitably point toward ever more
stringent ambient ozone standards and preordain--in principle--the outcome of periodic
reviews of the scientific basis of ozone regulation.  In practice, EPA’s response has been
to delay the inevitable.
The National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for all photochemical
oxidants was originally set in 1971 at a maximum hourly average of 0.08 ppm (parts per
million), not to be exceeded more than once per year.
26  According to a former EPA
political appointee, science played little role in the initial ozone NAAQS.
27  “[Former
Senator Edwin] Muskie [D-ME] wanted a 95% reduction—that was his goal.” The
principal scientific rationale for the 1971 standard was one study which reported that
asthmatics had more attacks on days when ozone levels were above 0.10 ppm.  A
subsequent reassessment of the study revealed that the actual exposure levels were
considerably higher (Landy et al. 1994).  In 1976, the American Petroleum Institute (API)
and the city of Houston petitioned EPA to revise the standard (Marraro 1982).
Consequently, EPA initiated a review of the NAAQS for Photochemical Oxidants in 1977
(McKee 1994).
In 1978, EPA finalized the Criteria Document (CD, an assessment of the available
scientific information regarding health and welfare effects) for photochemical oxidants and
proposed to revise the NAAQS.  The agency proposed to:  1) raise the primary NAAQS
to 0.10 ppm and retain the secondary NAAQS of 0.08 ppm;
28  2) measure and enforce the
standard using tropospheric ozone as the chemical indicator species for the family of
                                               
26 Photochemical oxidants are a class of highly reactive gases which includes ozone (O3).  They occur in
the troposphere (ground-level atmosphere) and are formed in chemical reactions that occur in the
presence of sunlight.  Stratospheric ozone, on the other hand, occurs higher in the atmosphere and filters
ultraviolet radiation.
27 The 1970 Clean Air Act gave EPA 90 days to propose six NAAQS.
28 Primary NAAQS are intended to protect the public from known or reasonably anticipated adverse
health effects with an adequate margin of safety.  Secondary NAAQS are intended to protect public
welfare from known or reasonably anticipated adverse effects on environmental and economic resources
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photochemical oxidants;
29 and 3) change the form of the standard from deterministic to
statistical to allow for inter-annual variation in weather conditions.
30  In 1979, after
President Carter’s Regulatory Analysis Review Group (operating primarily out of the
Office of Management and Budget), the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the Council of Economic Advisors, and API critically evaluated EPA’s proposal,
the agency set both the primary and secondary standards for ozone at 0.12 ppm.
Subsequently, API, the Natural Resources Defense Council and several other groups
petitioned the courts to review the standard.  The DC Circuit Court of Appeals held in
favor of EPA in its 1981 API v. Costle ruling.  At the center of the controversy were the
roles of official and ad hoc scientific advisory groups and of the Executive Office of the
President (EOP) in the agency’s decisionmaking process and EPA’s use of a controversial
evaluation procedure.
31  An outgrowth of the controversial 1979 ozone revision was the
institutional formalization of the NAAQS review process.  (For more on the historical
development of the NAAQS process, see Jasanoff 1990, Ch. 6).
By 1983, the EPA Office of Research and Development Environmental Criteria
and Assessment Office (ORD/ECAO) had initiated a review of the ozone CD in response
to the statutory requirement to review the NAAQS by 1985.
32  It was not until 1985,
however, that the Clean Air Act Science Advisory Committee (CASAC) reviewed the first
draft of the CD.  After CASAC’s initial review, ORD/ECAO began revisions, and the
EPA Office of Air and Radiation Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
(OAR/OAQPS) began drafting an Ozone Staff Paper (SP, an analysis forming the basis of
policy options and staff recommendations for NAAQS).  The following year, CASAC
reviewed the first draft of the SP and indicated its satisfaction with the second draft of the
CD in a “closure letter” to the Administrator.
During its 1987 review of the second draft of the SP, however, CASAC argued
that EPA should capture in its review of the ozone NAAQS new, emerging data on the
health effects and agricultural crop damages from longer exposures (6-8 hours and
seasonal exposures).  In response, ORD/ECAO drafted a Supplement to the 1986 CD
while OAR/OAQPS revised the SP again.  CASAC reviewed the documents in 1988.
Although the committee urged EPA to complete its review as rapidly as possible (it was
now 5 years overdue), CASAC’s 1989 closure letter to EPA Administrator William Reilly
revealed an internal division.  The committee indicated that the Supplement to the 1986
                                               
29 Of the major photochemical oxidants in ambient air, only ozone (O3) occurs at sufficiently high
concentrations to be a significant health concern.  Other photochemical oxidants such as hydrogen
peroxide (H2O2) and peroxyacetyl nitrate (PAN) only produce effects at higher concentrations than those
found in most cities (Horvath and McKee 1994).
30 A deterministic form defines areawide attainment of the standard as no more than x (e.g., 1)
exceedances of the standard in any given year.  A statistical form defines areawide attainment in terms of
an expected number of exceedances over a period (e.g., an average of no more than 3 exceedances over 3
consecutive years).
31 The assessment procedure involved an expert judgment elicitation process known as subjective
probability encoding.  See Marraro (1982) and Nazar (1994) for case studies of the 1979 revision.
32 The 1977 CAA Amendments required EPA to revise or reauthorize all of the NAAQS by Dec. 31,
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CD and the SP “provide an adequate scientific basis for the EPA to retain or revise” the
NAAQS for ozone (McKee 1994, emphasis added).  CASAC Chairman Morton Lippman
reported that the committee did reach consensus on the definition of adverse health effects
and sensitive populations groups, but only half of the members of CASAC believed the
current ozone standard was adequately protective of human health (Lippman 1989).  In
particular, according to an ORD official, “CASAC members had a split view on the multi-
While ECAO, OAQPS, and CASAC were busily reviewing ozone science, the
Bush administration and the Democratic-controlled Congress were immersed in legislative
negotiations to revise the Clean Air Act (CAA).  For the first time since 1977, it appeared
that the political planets were aligned to enable a reauthorization of the act.  According to
McKee (1994), “Following numerous discussions and briefings within EPA on the need
for modified and possibly more stringent [ozone] standards, it was determined that any
such changes might be disruptive of the ongoing Clean Air Act negotiations and that such
action should be delayed.”  According to an environmental lawyer, there was a meeting
late in 1989 during which senior EPA officials made the political decision not to revise the
NAAQS for ozone “unless they were forced to.”  Fearing that it would alienate
stakeholders involved in the legislative negotiations, however, the agency was unwilling to
announce its decision not to act.  According to an OAQPS official, “There was a policy
decision that the time was not ripe to take either action,” i.e., go public with a decision
that revisions are not appropriate or revise the standard on the basis of the existing record
of decision.  “The agency,” said this source, “didn’t want to rock the apple cart.”
After the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments were enacted, however, the American
Lung Association (ALA) and other plaintiffs filed suit in October 1991 to force EPA to
complete its review of the NAAQS for ozone.  The US District Court for the Eastern
District of New York ordered EPA to announce its proposed decision on whether to
revise the NAAQS for ozone by August 1992 and to announce its final decision by March
1993 (McKee 1994).  In August 1992, then-Administrator William Reilly proposed that
revisions to the ozone standards were not appropriate at that time. The notice did not take
into account more recent studies that had not been assessed in the 1986 Criteria
Document or its Supplement or reviewed by CASAC.  EPA estimated that 2-3 years
would be needed to assess and review the new information.
After the defeat of George Bush in the election of November 1992, President
Clinton appointed Carol Browner as Administrator of EPA.  In compliance with the court
order, Administrator Browner finalized the decision not to revise the ozone NAAQS in
March 1993.  Table B-1 provides a summarized background of the 1993 decision not to
revise the NAAQS for ozone.  Shortly after President Clinton was re-elected in the
November 1996 elections, EPA proposed to revise the NAAQS for ozone.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 27
Table B-1.  Background on the 1993 Ozone NAAQS Decision
1971 EPA sets NAAQS for photochemical oxidants at 0.08 ppm not to be exceeded more than 1
hour per year.
1977 EPA initiates review of Air Quality Criteria Document for Photochemical Oxidants
1978 EPA publishes final Criteria Document for Ozone and other Photochemical Oxidants.
EPA proposes to raise the primary NAAQS to 0.10 ppm, retain the 0.08 secondary standard,
base the photochemical standard on ozone, and change to standards with a statistical form
(i.e., expected exceedances).
1979 After public comment and EOP review, EPA revises the NAAQS to 0.12 ppm (primary and
secondary).
1981 U.S.D.C., DC upholds EPA’s decision in API v. Costle.
1982 EPA/ORD/ECAO initiates review of the Ozone Criteria Document.
1985 CASAC reviews draft Criteria Document.  EPA/ORD/ECAO prepares a new draft.
EPA/OAR/OAQPS begins drafting Ozone Staff Paper.
1986 CASAC reviews 1st draft of Staff Paper, 2nd draft of Criteria Document, sends EPA
Administrator closure letter indicating satisfaction with final Criteria Document.
1987 CASAC reviews 2nd draft of Staff Paper.  CASAC recommends incorporating new scientific
information.
1988 CASAC reviews draft supplement to the 1986 Criteria Document, 3rd draft of Staff Paper.
1989 CASAC sends EPA Administrator closure letter indicating that the Supplement and Staff
Paper “provide an adequate scientific basis for the EPA to retain or revise” the NAAQS for
ozone and suggests that EPA complete its review as rapidly as possible.
EPA delays changing the standard to avoid disrupting ongoing Clean Air Act negotiations.
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments passed.
1991 American Lung Association sues to compel EPA to complete the ozone NAAQS review.
1992 Under court order, EPA Administrator Reilly proposes not to revise the NAAQS for ozone.
EPA/ORD/ECAO initiates update of the CD.
1993 Administrator Browner announces that EPA would not modify the NAAQS for ozone.
2. Scientific Issues
Ozone is a highly reactive gas composed of three atoms of oxygen (O3). In the
upper atmosphere (the stratosphere), ozone filters out hazardous ultraviolet radiation from
the sun.  Stratospheric ozone is being depleted by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other
chemical compounds.  Closer to home in the troposphere, ozone is an atmospheric
pollutant and the most important of a class of pollutants called photochemical oxidants.
Ozone is described as a “secondary” air pollutant, because it is not emitted directly.
Instead, it is formed by atmospheric chemical reactions involving nitrogen oxides (NOx),
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and oxygen (O2) in the presence of sunlight.  High
ambient levels of ozone generally occur only when temperatures exceed 80 to 90￿ F.
Four out of five interviewees responded that the scientific information available in
1993 was adequate for regulatory decisionmaking.  (However, much of the information
had not been through the formal NAAQS review process.)  There is very little--if any--
disagreement among respondents concerning whether the principal scientific studies
demonstrate biological effects in humans, animals, and plants from ozone at levels belowParticulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 28
the current standard of 0.12 ppm for exposure periods exceeding one hour.  It is generally
agreed that the effects of long-term exposure to low concentrations of ozone can produce
greater effects than short-term exposure at peak concentrations, and that the effects
become progressively more significant as the duration of exposure increases.  “That the
observations exist is incontrovertible,” notes an industry scientist. “There is,” however, “a
raging debate about what is harmful and what is not.”  The question hinges on what
constitutes an adverse effect in a continuum of measurable biological changes occurring
down to background levels of ozone.
Health Effects
Respiratory effects have been the primary focus of study and concern for health
effects of ozone.  These include decreased lung function; respiratory symptoms such as
coughing and shortness of breath; decreased exercise performance; increased airway
sensitivity to allergens (e.g., contributing to asthma attacks); aggravation of existing
respiratory diseases such as chronic bronchitis and emphysema; pulmonary inflammation
and morphological effects (i.e., structural changes) in the lungs; and decreased ability to
defend against respiratory infections.  Ozone also causes a variety of detectable biological
changes outside the respiratory system (e.g., in red blood cell morphology and enzyme
activity) and appears to be one of many contributing factors to overall morbidity and
mortality (Horvath and McKee 1994).
 33
Evidence of these effects comes from both human and animal studies.  The best
documented evidence of health effects of ozone exposure are temporary decreases in lung
function (e.g.,  reduced lung capacity for a period of days).
34  Evidence of decreased lung
function comes from controlled human exposure, field, epidemiology, and animal
toxicology studies.
35  Clinical studies of human subjects under controlled exposure
conditions (i.e., in exposure chambers) provide the most reliable quantitative human
exposure-response data (in the 0.12 - 0.24 ppm range), but are limited to short-term (1-8
hr.) exposures and, generally, to healthy subjects.
36  According to an industry scientist, the
“seminal” clinical ozone studies originated from the EPA Human Studies Division of the
National Health and Environmental Effects Research Laboratory (NHEERL).
37  Heavily
                                               
33 At the time of the 1993 decision, relatively few studies of the effects of ozone on mortality had been
conducted.  However, a recent draft study reported by the independent Health Effects Institute indicates
that ozone has an effect on mortality which is independent of the effects of ambient particulates, sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide.  As a group, the other pollutants also appear to contribute
to mortality, but their independent, individual effects could not be identified (Risk Policy Report, 4/19/96,
p. 9).
34 Clinical, field, and epidemiological studies have also reported associations between ozone levels as low
as 0.10-0.12 ppm and a variety of mild-to-moderate respiratory symptoms (e.g., throat irritation and
coughing), but these data are regarded as less reliable than the lung function measurements because the
symptoms are inherently more subjective  (Horvath and McKee 1994).
35 Field studies contain elements of both controlled human exposures and epidemiological studies.
36 In some cases, asthmatic subjects have been tested.
37 NHEERL is a division of the Office of Research and Development (ORD).  The EPA facility is located
at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.  There are a limited number of facilities capable of
conducting clinical ozone exposure studies.  According to an ORD official, other such facilities are locatedParticulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 29
exercising, healthy, young (mostly male) subjects have experienced measurable (i.e., small,
but statistically significant) decreases in lung function during controlled exposures of ‡
0.12 ppm ozone for 1-2 hours.
38 Measurable decreases in lung function have also been
observed in intermittently exercising subjects exposed to concentrations as low as 0.08
ppm when exposures last 6-8 hours.  The level of exercise and individual responsiveness
(i.e., sensitivity) to ozone play a large role in the extent of lung function decrease at a
given ozone concentration and exposure duration (Horvath and McKee 1994).
39
Studies have also observed variability among individuals in their ability tolerate
ozone.  That is, after successive ozone exposures, the pulmonary function response
attenuates to some degree.  According to an EPA research official, this has described as a
positive response (evidence that the effects are not long-lasting) or a negative response
(indicating that the lungs’ defenses are being circumvented).  An industry scientist says,
“with ozone tolerance, we don’t know what’s going on.”
Epidemiology and field studies provide evidence of measurable decreases in lung
function from ambient ozone exposures ranging from 0.08 to 0.12 ppm, depending upon
length of exposure.  However, it may be difficult to separate the independent effects of
ozone from those of other air pollutants (e.g., particulates and acid aerosols) and other
environmental variables (e.g., high temperature and humidity) in these studies.  The
observed effects may be an additive combination of factors, or alternatively, ozone may
interact with these variables to produce decreases in lung function “greater than the sum
The first of several epidemiological studies of children engaged in normal activity
at summer camps in the Northeast and California appeared in 1983 (Lippman et al.
1983).
40  These studies reported an association between decreased lung function in
children and short-term exposure to ambient ozone concentrations.  One of the summer
camp studies (Spektor, Lippman, and Lioy 1988) reported measurable decreases in lung
                                                                                                                                           
at the University of California, Santa Barbara; Rancho Los Amigos Medical Center, Downey, CA; and
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  According to this source, the U of C facility receives federal research
support from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) and EPA.  Rancho Los
Amigos is supported by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), General Motors (GM), and other
industry sources.  The U of M facility is supported by GM.
38 Average lung function decreases by approximately 5% for very heavily exercising human subjects
exposed to 0.2 ppm ozone for 2 hours.  However, there is considerable inter-individual variability in
response.  Controlled exposures to 0.12 ppm ozone during very heavy exercise have resulted in individual
lung function decreases up to 16% for adults and up to 22% for children (Horvath and McKee 1994).
39 Controlled studies of resting human subjects (conducted mainly in the 1970s) found little or no change
in lung function.  An increased level of exercise is associated with increased respiration rates, deeper
breathing, and oral breathing.  For a given ambient ozone concentration, the respiratory system receives
an increased ozone dosage with elevated respiration rates.  Oral breathing also results in greater
penetration of ozone into the respiratory system.
40 New York University Medical Center’s Lippman and colleagues conducted studies in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut with support from NIEHS and EPA.  U of M, Ann Arbor’s Higgins and
colleagues conducted another youth summer camp study in the San Bernandino mountains of Southern
California.Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 30
function in children exposed to ozone levels that did not exceed the current one-hour
standard of 0.12 ppm.  In some cases, the lung function decreases persisted for up to a
week (Horvath and McKee 1994).  An industry scientist finds the epidemiological studies
with children in summer camps to be the most reliable data on ozone health effects
because children at play during the summer are a highly exposed, susceptible population
and because their level of activity was not under artificial experimental control.  The first
of a series of epidemiological studies of healthy adults engaged in outdoor exercise
appeared in 1988 (Spektor, Lippman et al. 1988b). These studies also reported
measurable decreases in lung function following short-term exposure at ozone
concentrations below 0.12 ppm.
41  Thus, a variety of sources indicate measurable lung
function decrements in different populations engaged in varying levels of activity in
response to ozone concentrations at or below the current standard.  However, these
results beg the question of the health significance of measurable decreases in pulmonary
function.
The summer camp studies also provided indications of persistent pulmonary
inflammation and lung morphological changes in the children.  According to Horvath and
McKee (1994), these effects represent a potentially more important ozone health response
than the more transient effects reported in most controlled exposure studies.  Some have
suggested that the responses could contribute to maldevelopment of the lungs in children.
A number of studies provide evidence that short-term exposures to relatively low levels of
ozone can inflame lung tissue.  Researchers in EPA’s Human Studies Division have
reported pulmonary tissue inflammation in intermittently exercising subjects following
exposure to 0.08 - 0.10 ppm ozone for more than 6 hours (e.g., Koren et al. 1991).  While
a limited number of such exposures would not cause permanent damage in most
individuals because of the body’s self-repair capacity, many long-term (e.g., months or
years) animal studies have shown that repeated ozone exposures causing lung
inflammation eventually result in morphological changes in the lungs and accelerated
permanent loss of lung function (i.e., “lung aging”).  An autopsy study of cadavers in Los
Angeles County (where ozone levels are typically the highest in the country) also revealed
a higher-than-expected number of lung lesions, although researchers were unable to
determine the contribution from smoking (Horvath and McKee 1994).
An OAQPS official states that former CASAC panel chair Roger McClellan of the
Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology disputes the significance of lesions observed in
the lungs of animals and of cadavers from Los Angeles associated with chronic exposures
to ambient ozone levels.  The reasoning is that lungs have excess capacity or a reserve
capability and that the lesions are not manifest clinical symptoms.  According to this
official, the lung lesions might impinge on quality of life by causing shortness of breath
from mild exertion with age rather than causing or contributing to mortality, as some have
suggested.  According to an industry scientist, there is considerable uncertainty about the
reversibility of the pulmonary lesions observed in the long-term animal studies.  “The
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also conducted a study of adult hikers on Mt.Washington, NH that found an association between ambient
ozone levels and decreased lung function (Korrick et al. 1992).Particulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 31
problem is to determine what is a homeostatic response, a normal reversible change
associated with defense, as opposed to what changes are associated with permanent, long-
term damage.”  An ORD official also points to the uncertainties in extrapolating the
results of the chronic exposures from animals to humans.  “We have made some progress
on dosimetric models for extrapolating from animals to humans.  The hope was that they
would be ready for this round of review, but we’re not there yet.”
Non-Health Effects
The effects of ozone exposure on vegetation have been the primary focus of the
secondary standard.  There is general acknowledgment that vegetative effects occur at
levels of exposure below 0.12 ppm and that certain plant species are more sensitive to
ozone than are humans.  According to an OAQPS official, “it is certain that ecological
effects are occurring.”  Similar to the situation of ozone health effects, however, there is
no collective certainty about what to make of the observed changes.  Many early
“phytotoxicity” studies assessed the effects of ozone on plants in terms of foliar injury
(e.g., leaf necrosis--dead leaves--or leaf drop); however the extent of foliar injury (in terms
of percent of the crop exhibiting symptoms) can be much greater than that of crop yield
loss.  Conversely, significant yield losses can occur with little or no foliar injury (Tingey et
al. 1994).  An ORD scientist hypothesizes that tropospheric ozone may have its greatest
ecological impact not on plant productivity but by exerting selection pressure that
ultimately alters species composition within ecological communities and genetic variability
within species.  For example, the fact that many trees in the eastern US are less sensitive
to ozone than their western cousins may be an adaptive evolutionary response to higher
ozone levels.  Whether such changes are to be regarded as “important” is another issue.
The chief concern for the secondary effects of ozone has been on agricultural and
timber crop yields due to their economic value.  Using data collected by a multi-site
experimental program initiated in 1980 (the National Crop Loss Assessment Network,
NCLAN), EPA analysts estimate that current ambient ozone exposures result in a 14%
yield loss for major US crops and that yield losses would continue to occur even if all US
sites would attain the current secondary NAAQS of 0.12 ppm (Tingey et al. 1994).
However, reviewers (e.g., Adams et al. 1984) have criticized NCLAN’s experimental
design, use of sensitive crop cultivars which maximize plant response to ozone, and failure
to incorporate agricultural practices (e.g., increased fertilization) that could offset the yield
reductions caused by ozone exposure.
42  A factor that has seriously impeded the
assessment of the effects ozone on crops and natural resources is the lack of rural ambient
air monitoring sites.
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that were used.  A large number of experimental replications over a few concentration levels increases the
chances that the study would detect effects even if they are relatively small and may facilitate a
mechanistic understanding of the effect of ozone on plant growth.  However, Adams et al. (1984) observe
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The selection of the ozone exposure indicator related to plant yields has been a
difficult problem in formulating a secondary standard.  The indices which best predict
yields are measures of cumulative exposure that give greater weight to peak exposure days
(e.g., a weighted sum over the growing season).  There remain questions, however,
regarding the practicality of this form of the indicator for regulatory purposes (Tingey et
al. 1994).
The Effects of Weather
Hot, stagnant weather increases ambient ozone levels.  Ozone and its precursors
(VOCs and NOx) are also transported considerable distances by air masses.  As a result,
ozone levels--and the number of exceedances of the NAAQS level--are sensitive to
variations in meteorological conditions (Yosie et al. 1994).  In addition, high heat and
humidity appear to intensify the health effects of ozone (Horvath and McKee 1994).
3. The Process within EPA
Setting the Agenda
The 1991 ALA lawsuit against EPA was the factor most frequently cited by
respondents as being responsible for getting the ozone NAAQS on the agency’s agenda.
According to an independent policy analyst, “They [EPA] were going to delay as long as
they could until ALA forced the issue.”  Of course, legislative provisions requiring
periodic review of the NAAQS and permitting citizen lawsuits enabled ALA’s agenda-
setting action.
According to an air program official, something that contributed to elevating
ozone on the agency’s agenda was that prior to the 1989 decision not to revise the
standard, “Vocal scientists, particularly [former Assistant Administrator for ORD]
Bernard Goldstein and [CASAC Chairman] Mort Lippman, met with the Administrator
and pounded the table that they had studies that ... suggested that [adverse health effects]
were happening on a longer time frame, 6-8 hours,” than the form of the current standard
(1 hour).
Another factor that may have contributed indirectly to forcing ozone up the EPA
agenda was the scientific information that agency researchers had generated since the
1988 Supplement to the Criteria Document.  This data demonstrated that one could
induce measurable biological changes in humans, animals, and plants at ever-lower ozone
concentrations.  From 1988-1992, clinical studies reported by EPA’s Human Studies
Division incrementally lowered the bar by increasing the subjects’ level of activity and
duration of exposure.  Similarly, NCLAN researchers designed experiments to detect plant
responses at the lowest levels of ozone.  In both cases, the pattern of searching for the
lowest levels of ozone at which biological effects could be detected was consistent with
the misguided presumption under the Clean Air Act of a threshold concentration below
which no adverse effects would occur.  According to an ORD scientist, the EPA airParticulate Matter and Ozone NAAQS 33
program framed the research question as “at what level can you detect a change.”  This
source describes the situation as one in which “analysts, not policymakers, were involved
in discussing what effects to measure.”  Absent these and other studies documenting
measurable responses to ozone concentrations below the existing standard, ALA
presumably would have had little institutional incentive to compel the agency to complete
its review.
Assessing the State of the Science
According to an environmental lawyer, the most important studies on the effects of
6-8 hr. low-level ozone exposures were reported in 1989-93, after the Supplement to the
1986 Criteria Document was closed.  An ORD official says the agency was overwhelmed
attempting to keep up with the science.  “There had been over 1,000 new scientific papers
in the literature since the last ozone decision, and the agency is expected to analyze each
one.”  No formal NAAQS review of the science was conducted prior to the 1993 decision
not to revise the ozone standard, but EPA staff scientists who tracked the expanding
literature believed that the information that had accumulated since the 1988 CD
Supplement “pointed in the direction of multi-hour exposures having effects on pulmonary
responses at lower concentrations than the current standard,” according to another ORD
official.
Communicating the Science to Agency Leadership
Sometime during the winter of 1992-93, between unpacking boxes and
“Reinventing EPA,” members of the EPA transition team and the new administration were
briefed on the ozone NAAQS by OAQPS staff.  The staff indicated the “direction” in
which the new science was pointing, according to an EPA official.  But since ECAO was
in the earliest stages of preparing a new Criteria Document at the time of the briefing,
43 it
was clear that there would be insufficient time to conduct a full-blown NAAQS review
prior to the court-ordered deadline.  According to a former EPA air program official, this
sort of communication, in which decisionmakers are briefed about the “directionality” of
the evolving science and the studies currently underway that could have a major impact on
the rulemaking is typical of a decision not to revise a standard.
The Role of External Scientists in the Process
Although external scientists apparently had no direct involvement in EPA’s 1993
decision not to revise the NAAQS for ozone, CASAC’s historical involvement played a
significant role.  In contrast to the position of the official scientific advisory panel which
reviewed EPA’s 1979 revision, CASAC adopted a more precautionary approach regarding
what constitutes an adverse health effect in the 1980s review of the Criteria Document for
ozone (Jasanoff 1990, pp. 115-116).  By defining reversible changes in lung function and
non-clinical symptoms as adverse health effects, CASAC set a precedent that narrowed
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policy options and paved the way for the lack of consensus on a policy recommendation.
After setting this precedent, according to an independent policy analyst, the committee
was “unwilling to redefine reversible health effects resulting from short-term exposures as
‘not adverse.’”  While the committee justified their negotiated definition of reversible
changes as adverse on the basis of the understood effects of short-term studies, the
concern of some members may have been focused more on the poorly understood effects
of chronic exposures.  As this source suggests, “In part, this [the committee’s
precautionary definition of adverse effects] may be due to a recognition by the committee
of the inability of the available observational methods to capture potentially irreversible
effects resulting from chronic exposures.”
Respondents stated that the significance of the reported effects from exposures
below 0.12 ppm for periods of 6-8 hours was the primary source of division within
CASAC that lead it to recommend that EPA “retain or revise” the existing NAAQS for
ozone.  These were the same effects that the committee had, by “consensus” defined as
adverse.  Apparently, this consensus was a fragile one.  According to EPA officials, there
was a strong consensus within CASAC that the standard should not be relaxed, but some
committee members felt that the level of the 1-hour standard should be lowered or the
form of the standard should be changed to an 8-hour average, while others believed that
the database was not sufficiently “ripe” to recommend any change.  According to an
industry scientist, Morton Lippman, CASAC chair during the 1980s review, “firmly
believes that his studies in the children’s camps demonstrate detrimental effects at ambient
4. Science in the Final Decision
According to a former senior EPA official,
the Reilly administration proposed not to revise
the ozone NAAQS in 1992 “because CASAC was
divided and the 1990 CAA amendments had
recently been passed.”  Regarding the role of
science in the decision not to revise, an OAQPS
official says, “Based on record up through 1988, there was not a compelling case to revise
the standard.  And if there was a compelling case, it would have never gotten through the
agency.”
There was apparently some informal calculus which considered the science in
terms of the incremental benefits arising from a marked change in the form, if not in the
overall stringency, of the standard.  (Recall that such a change was enacted in the 1987
PM-10 revision.  See accompanying case study on particulate matter.)  An EPA air
program official noted the resultant “disruption that would occur in the ozone control
program.”  Changing the form of the standard from 1-hour to 8-hours would require “new
models, new monitoring procedures, and would essentially bring the control program to a
stop for 2-3 years.”  This raised the question in the minds of air program officials of
whether the incremental protection that the agency would gain by simply adopting a
The Reilly administration proposed
not to revise the ozone NAAQS in
1992 “because CASAC was divided
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longer averaging time was worth the disruption in the program.  “We concluded that it
was not ready.  It was more strategic than tactical,” says this source.
According to respondents, the focus of
decisionmaking by the Browner administration
early in 1993 was on negotiating the ozone
NAAQS review schedule with the plaintiff
(ALA).  Although the role of science in the
final decisionmaking was not substantive, the
scientific review process was considered.  In
the view of an ORD official, the 1993 decision was “science-driven” in that EPA needed
sufficient time to adequately analyze the vast amount of new information that had
accumulated on ozone since 1988.  Of course, the Browner administration had no control
over the early stage at which it inherited the ozone NAAQS review process from the
Reilly administration.  Furthermore, despite the members’ familiarity with the available
scientific literature, the lack of consensus within CASAC ruled out the possibility that the
committee’s review would be rapid or perfunctory.  An OAQPS official sympathizes with
the Administrator’s position in finalizing the agency’s decision not to revise the standard.
“In fairness to Browner, she had no choice but to sign it.”
5. Concluding Observations
In terms of a fate and transport analogy, this case illustrates that for criteria air
pollutants, a full-blown NAAQS review is required to make science “available for uptake”
by EPA decisionmakers.  Information generated inside and outside EPA may be released
into the public domain for several years and subjected to peer-review.  It may permeate
throughout the agency, with its implications fully understood by staff.  But the information
is not actionable until the NAAQS procedural requirements are satisfied.  Furthermore, the
lack of a consensus recommendation from CASAC to revise the standard provides the
Administrator with “an out” to justify not revising the NAAQS on the basis of “scientific
uncertainty.”  Therefore, the scientific evidence of effects at levels below the existing
standard which is available to the decisionmaker can be neutralized by policy
disagreements within CASAC.  This is illustrated schematically in Figure B-1.
The 1993 decision not to revise the
ozone NAAQS was “science-driven” in
that EPA needed sufficient time to
adequately analyze the vast amount of
new information that had accumulated
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Figure B-1.  Fate and Transport Dynamics for Science in the 1993 Decision Not
to Revise the Ozone Standard.
Epilogue:  After EPA’s 1993 decision not to revise the NAAQS for ozone, the
American Lung Association sought judicial review of the EPA decision, citing the
agency’s failure to consider all relevant, available scientific information.  The decision was
voluntarily remanded to the agency, but in 1994, the ALA again sued (unsuccessfully) to
force EPA to complete the review by the end of 1995 (Environment Reporter, 10/14/94).
In 1995 (10 years after the statutory deadline for completing the review), OAQPS released
a staff paper which recommended changing the standard to 0.07 ppm to 0.09 ppm
measured over eight hours.  Noting the continuum of biological effects observed down to
background ozone levels, CASAC endorsed replacing the 1-hour primary standard with an
8-hour standard but did not recommend any specific level.  In CASAC’s 1995 closure
letter to Administrator Browner, the committee stated that “ozone may elicit a continuum
of biological responses down to background concentrations.  This means that the
paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects level and then providing
an ‘adequate margin of safety’ is no longer possible” (Environment Reporter, 1/19/96, pp.
1756-1757).
Shortly after the elections in November 1996, EPA proposed to revise the
NAAQS for ozone, basing the primary standard on 8-hour averages, and setting it at a
level of 0.07 - 0.09 ppm.  The agency also proposed to replace the current secondary
standard with one of two alternative standards:  one identical to the new primary standard
or, alternatively, a new seasonal standard expressed as a sum of hourly ozone
concentrations greater than or equal to 0.06 ppm, cumulated over 12 hours per day during
the ozone season (Fed. Reg., Vol. 27, p. 1672).
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ALA American Lung Association
CAA Clean Air Act
CASAC Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
CD Criteria Document
ECAO Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standard
NCLAN National Crop Loss Assessment Network
NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
OAQPS Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
OAR Office of Air and Radiation
ORD Office of Research and Development
SP Staff Paper